Multiple military and social indicators suggest growing pressure on the Houthis’ manpower structure. While the movement’s ideological core is sustaining battlefield losses, parts of its wider non-ideological recruitment and support base are beginning to fracture or reposition.

The shift coincides with reports of Houthi fighters fleeing positions on the Marib fronts, attempts to mobilize civilians for deployment along the western coast, and rising public anger over deteriorating economic conditions.

Three Significant Shifts

Actor and content creator Ahmed Al-Jaishi recently left Houthi-controlled territory and, within weeks, became a prominent supporter of government forces. His Facebook audience of approximately 1.4 million gives the shift broader significance, depriving the Houthis of an influential voice with extensive reach inside Yemen.

Before leaving, Al-Jaishi attracted attention with a video titled “I Am Hungry,” portraying worsening living conditions. Local reports said the Houthis subsequently removed advertisements featuring his image from streets in Sanaa, although the movement offered no official explanation.

A second shift came from Hashem Jameel, an artificial intelligence trainer and specialist who had worked within the Houthis’ technical environment. Jameel publicly declared his readiness to join any formation fighting the movement, offering to contribute through training, development, technical expertise or field duties. He has not yet announced joining a specific military unit.

The third indicator came from Amin Atef, a prominent Hashid tribal figure aligned with the Houthis. Atef publicly outlined scenarios for an imminent change, including internal collapse, fragmentation of defending forces, declining supplies, a negotiated transfer of control or a rapid offensive following the exhaustion of Houthi defenses.

Atef has not defected. However, a tribal ally openly discussing how Houthi control might end suggests declining confidence in the movement’s ability to preserve its position.

Desertions and Civilian Mobilization

Sheba Intelligence has obtained information indicating that Houthi personnel have fled some positions on the Marib fronts amid mounting losses, supply problems and military pressure.

Along the western coast, the movement is attempting to mobilize civilians and recruit additional personnel to reinforce its deployments. The reliance on broader civilian mobilization points to difficulty generating enough trained and trusted fighters to sustain simultaneous commitments across Marib, the coast and other active fronts.

A previous Sheba Intelligence report examined the case of Brigadier General Salah Muqbil Al-Salahi, former commander of the Houthi 10th “Sammad” Brigade, as an indicator of both recruitment difficulties and loyalty concerns.

Following Al-Salahi’s 2025 defection, the Houthis did not replace his approximately 250-strong unit with an entirely new formation. Instead, they subjected its personnel to renewed military, ideological and security training before adding around 250 other fighters. The same report documented delayed salaries and the growing use of retraining, unit mergers and transfers between fronts. 

The Ideological Core Under Pressure

The Houthis have long depended on two manpower layers: an ideological core that occupies command, supervisory and specialized positions, and a broader pool recruited through salaries, tribal influence or local interests.

The core was heavily depleted during previous phases of the war and is again facing more accurate battlefield strikes following the government forces’ introduction of tactical drones. These systems are being used for reconnaissance, target acquisition and artillery correction, including for self-propelled artillery, improving the ability to track movements and strike operational personnel near front lines.

Losses within this core are difficult to replace because its members combine ideological commitment with years of military and security experience. Meanwhile, the wider non-ideological pool is becoming less reliable as casualties, unpaid salaries, economic hardship and uncertainty over the balance of power weaken recruitment and loyalty.

Seeking a Political Lifeline

Ali Al-Bukhaiti, the Houthis’ former spokesman and one of the movement’s earliest prominent defectors, recently told Al Arabiya that the movement had become weaker and was seeking to avoid war. According to his assessment, the Houthis want their file included in any negotiations with Iran to secure a political lifeline and escape an anticipated military defeat.

This helps explain the contradiction between continued Houthi attacks and mobilization on the one hand, and efforts to avoid a broad ground confrontation on the other.

The simultaneous depletion of the ideological core, fragmentation of the wider recruitment base and growing public anger could create a significant opening for the Yemeni army. If government forces maintain coordinated pressure across several fronts while expanding their effective use of drones and artillery, the Houthis’ manpower problems may develop into an operational vulnerability capable of accelerating a military outcome.