Secret security measures include relocating senior figures, disguising former residences as meeting sites, and appointing undisclosed intelligence officers linked to internal information cells.

       Exclusive information obtained by Sheba Intelligence indicates that senior figures from Houthi intelligence bodies held a joint security meeting in a former government building north of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, with the participation of officials linked to missile operations.

According to the information, the meeting focused on the group’s internal security environment amid growing fears of intelligence penetration, possible targeted strikes, and the movement of sensitive military and security figures away from exposed locations in Sana’a.

The meeting approved a package of security and intelligence measures, including raising intelligence readiness, tracking suspected cells and informants believed by the group to be working with foreign intelligence services, and investigating possible infiltration around senior Houthi leaders.

One of the most sensitive outcomes was an instruction to notify first-tier leaders, other important commanders, and officers in Houthi intelligence and preventive security bodies to change their residences. The same measures reportedly included disguising previous residences as meeting places, in an apparent attempt to confuse surveillance, protect movement patterns, and reduce the risk of direct targeting.

The measures suggest that the Houthis are no longer treating the threat as purely external or military. Instead, the group appears to be dealing with a wider internal security crisis in which residential patterns, daily movements, protection circles, communications and close associates are being treated as possible vulnerabilities.

The meeting also approved a list of new intelligence appointments. The officers were reportedly nominated to serve as undisclosed intelligence pillars whose identities and roles would remain unknown, even inside parts of the group’s own structure. Their task would be to link with social cells and secret information units affiliated with the Supreme Security Committee, which is supervised by Ali Hussein al-Houthi, the interior minister in the Houthi-run, unrecognized government and founder of the police intelligence apparatus.

The meeting also ordered changes in security and communications procedures, including stronger precautions against close associates, the installation of cameras at entrances, the daily review of camera footage, and analysis of movement patterns around sensitive sites and individuals.

These steps appear to reflect a broader Houthi attempt to reduce exposure after a period marked by hidden strikes, internal suspicion and reported movement of security and military figures away from Sana’a. They also indicate that the group is trying to harden not only missile and drone sites, but also the human network that manages command, protection and intelligence.

The development comes after Sheba Intelligence previously reported that an IRGC-linked technical cell connected to the Houthi Jihad Council had been reviewing the relocation or redistribution of missile and drone centers from the western coast and Hodeidah toward alternative mountainous and desert areas, including Al-Jawf. That review was understood to be aimed at preparing hardened alternative operations rooms and launch environments in the event of renewed long-range strikes.

In parallel, recent hidden strikes against Houthi-linked military positions have deepened the group’s concern that its command structure, launch sites and support networks may be increasingly exposed. The reported targeting of sites in Al-Bayda and Hajjah added to these concerns because both areas are connected to military geography relevant to the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab and missile-launch routes.

The latest meeting also fits with what Yemeni and regional press reports have described as the movement or flight of some Houthi security and military figures from Sana’a toward areas outside the group’s direct control, including government-held territory. Whether driven by fear, internal disputes or security pressure, such movements appear to have increased the group’s sensitivity toward infiltration and loyalty checks.

According to the information obtained by Sheba Intelligence, the meeting was attended by Abdulrahman al-Houthi, head of presidential protection intelligence; Mohammed Jughman al-Zubairi, an assistant intelligence official at the presidency; Ibrahim Taher, a liaison officer at the office of the chief of staff; Mohammed al-Wajih, official in charge of protecting experts; Anwar al-Mahaqeri, a liaison officer in preventive security; and Najib Awad al-Razihi, an intelligence liaison officer. Other intelligence officers reportedly attended, including Youssef al-Sulaimi, Mohammed Shammous, Abdullah Ahmed al-Qahoum and Mohammed al-Najjar.

The presence of officials linked to missile operations gives the meeting a military-security dimension. It suggests that the Houthis are connecting internal protection measures directly to the survivability of their missile and drone infrastructure, especially as tensions around the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab continue to shape the group’s strategic calculations.

The overall picture points to a dual-track Houthi response: preparing for possible war or renewed precision strikes, while rebuilding internal intelligence layers to detect penetration. In practical terms, the group appears to be hiding not only weapons and launch sites, but also commanders, residences, communications channels and the people responsible for protecting its most sensitive military files.