Exclusive: Houthis Mobilize Forces Struggling with Recruitment, Unpaid Salaries and Loyalty Concerns
As the Houthi movement expands military mobilization across several fronts, information obtained by Sheba Intelligencereveals that the ground forces being prepared for a possible wider conflict are facing growing recruitment, funding and loyalty problems.
The pressure is not limited to a single unit or front. It affects formations previously regarded as elite forces and reflects broader weaknesses within the Houthi military structure, including dependence on existing fighters, unpaid salaries, declining central funding and fears of further defections.
Mobilization Exposes Recruitment Problems
One indication of the Houthis’ recruitment difficulties is their handling of the force previously commanded by defected officer Salah Ali Abdullah Muqbil al-Salahi.
Al-Salahi had approximately 250 fighters under his command. Following his defection, the Houthis did not replace the unit with an entirely new formation. Instead, they subjected the existing personnel to renewed military, ideological and security training before adding approximately 250 other fighters.
The move shows that the Houthis remain dependent on experienced personnel even when their loyalty comes under suspicion. It also suggests difficulty recruiting sufficient numbers of reliable new fighters, despite continued mobilization and preparations for confrontation.
Rather than generating new formations, the movement is increasingly relying on retraining existing personnel, combining units and transferring fighters between fronts.
Fighters Remain Unpaid
According to Sheba Intelligence’s information, Houthi fighters have not received their salaries for the most recent months.
Some units previously received two separate payments: a central allocation from the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Defense and General Staff, and another payment provided by the military region under which they served.
The central allocation has now stopped, while the remaining payments depend largely on the financial resources available to individual military regions.
This reflects a significant funding shortfall within the Houthi Ministry of Defense and General Staff. It has also created disparities between units, with some regional commands able to provide limited payments while other formations remain without regular salaries.
The financial pressure comes as the movement demands greater readiness, wider deployments and participation in potentially prolonged and high-risk operations.
Fear of Defections Deepens Internal Distrust
The retraining of al-Salahi’s former fighters also highlights growing concerns over loyalty inside Houthi units.
The process was not limited to military instruction. It included ideological reorientation, security screening and renewed loyalty assessments before the fighters were returned to active service.
Adding a similar number of personnel to the unit may also have been intended to weaken the cohesion of the original force, increase internal oversight and prevent the former commander’s influence from remaining within its ranks.
The Houthis therefore face a growing contradiction: weakening recruitment forces them to retain experienced fighters, while fears of defections prevent them from fully trusting some of the personnel they cannot replace.
The Fourth Military Region as a Case Study
The Fourth Military Region provides a significant example of these wider pressures, particularly as Houthi reinforcements continue to move toward the Taiz fronts.
The region is strategically important because its operational environment includes Taiz and the Mocha axis near the Bab al-Mandab Strait. It also includes areas of Lahj overlooking the Gulf of Aden, particularly the Al-Arah coast, which is considered one of the most exposed areas to maritime smuggling routes.
Al-Anad Air Base in Lahj also lies within this operational environment and remains a source of concern for the Houthis because of its potential use in supporting air operations against the movement.
The region additionally faces southern forces and the Giants Brigades across connected fronts extending through Taiz, Mocha, Lahj and Al-Dhalea. Its importance therefore extends beyond a conventional land command to include access toward Bab al-Mandab, maritime supply routes, a potential air threat and confrontation with some of the strongest anti-Houthi forces.
Continued Dependence on Ideological Commanders
The leadership history of the Fourth Military Region reflects a broader pattern in the Houthi military structure.
Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim, known as Abu Ali al-Hakim, previously commanded the region before being promoted to lead the movement’s military intelligence apparatus.
In April 2017, he was succeeded by Abdul Latif Hamoud Yahya al-Mahdi, known as Abu Nasr al-Shaath, a Saada-born commander who participated in the six Saada wars.
According to information obtained by Sheba Intelligence, al-Mahdi was later promoted to command the Houthi infantry forces.
The career paths of al-Hakim and al-Mahdi show how the movement continues to place ideological commanders from the Saada wars in charge of sensitive military regions before promoting them to senior positions overseeing intelligence and ground forces.
This reliance reflects the high level of trust placed in the movement’s ideological core. It also indicates limited confidence in newer commanders to manage major combat formations and strategically important operational zones.
The available indicators show that the Houthis are expanding military mobilization while their ground forces face accumulated pressure in recruitment, financing, morale and loyalty. The movement may remain capable of launching operations and sustaining short-term escalation, but a prolonged conflict, heavier casualties and wider deployments could expose deeper weaknesses in its ability to replace fighters and preserve unit cohesion.