The Red Sea Chaos and the War of Attrition

In a previous report by Sheba Intelligence, it was revealed that there are indications that the Houthi group's offensive capabilities have been affected as a result of the U.S.-UK strikes which began after the Houthis targeted ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea.

Sheba Intelligence tried to monitor daily events and track the attacks and interceptions officially announced by the U.S. Central Command and the Houthi group. This report summarizes the statistics of the missiles, drones, and suicide and Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USV) that the Houthi group launched. It also presents details about the U.S.-British operations that intercepted or foiled the Houthi attacks before being launched between January 12 and February 8, 2024.

However, what has been observed during the past three days (Feb. 8, 9, and 10) is that the international coalition focused on attacking boats, destroying about four on February 8 and four on February 9 and February 10. This may be due to the Houthis' attempt to intensify their attacks through boats with a slowdown in the use of anti-ship missiles and drones, or the international forces determined the launch center for those boats and began targeting them nonstop.

This report contributes to illustrating the size of the battle taking place in the Red Sea, its equilibrium, the type of weapons used, whether the offensive operations by the Houthi group or the preventive strikes by the international coalition, and the motives behind the Houthis' attacks on the Red Sea.

First: Attacks and interceptions by international forces

American and British forces in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea intercepted about 125 attacks, including cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, land-attack missiles, drones, and unmanned and manned surface boats. The interception of drones constituted more than 74% of all defensive operations.

The American-British forces attacked and destroyed about 69 sites for launching cruise and anti-ship ballistic missiles, centers for land attacks, centers for helicopters and drones, and radar sites.

Many attacks by international forces are described as "preventive", and focused on missile launch platforms, while they rarely announce that the strikes targeted weapons depots. The international forces also did not reveal the assassination of military leaders. However, Sheba Intelligence published information about the targeting of about fifty Iranian experts in the strikes on Houthi sites.

The attack on anti-ship missile launch platforms constituted most of the international forces'strikes, accounting for 70%.

Second: Attacks by the Houthi group

The Houthis' attacks on Israeli, American, and British ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea have varied, as the Yemeni group officially announced about 166 attacks using cruise and anti-ship ballistic missiles, land attacks, drones, and uncrewed boats.

The Houthi group, with Iranian support, has conducted dangerous attacks with various types of weapons that have caused chaos in the international trade lanes in the Red Sea. It is also preparing for a  long war to confront the international coalition forces. Therefore, the less expensive and more chaotic drone attacks constituted about 69% of its attacks, and the group has not acknowledged losses.

Third: Sheba Intelligence statistics on the attacks announced by both sides:

Through the Houthis' announcement of their attacks and the U.S. Central Command's announcement of their operations, Sheba Intelligence documented about 237 attacks and targets. The Houthi drone attacks or their interception and targeting by the U.S.-UK strikes constitute about 54% of the overall targets, followed by Houthi missile attacks and interception or preventive strikes by U.S.-UK forces at about 42%.

Propaganda and war of attrition:

The use of Iranian-modified drones and missiles by the Houthi group is an indication of a long proxy war and attrition that the group has prepared for. The fact that the international coalition remains within the framework of interception or preventive strikes indicates that it does not wish to expand the war. The coalition has not declared attacks on Iranian targets in Yemen or the assassination of leaders belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. This approach is an escape from any direct confrontation with Iran, and it aims to put pressure on the Houthis to stop targeting ships.

Undoubtedly, an asymmetric war constitutes a major drain on the regular forces, which makes the Houthi group lose less in terms of material costs. Shooting down a missile or drone worth a few thousand dollars requires missiles worth millions of dollars. However, it seems that the American and British forces took a different approach in dealing with the Houthi group, namely, focusing on preventative attacks to inflict losses on the group.

Preventive attacks mean that the high-cost missile targets missile platforms ready for launch, which raises the material and human losses for the Houthi group, as a single strike affects the inventory of an entire military site and the launch team, in addition to affecting morale and the feeling of the group's fighters of being monitored and tracked. This limits the presence of missile launch platforms in open areas, especially coastal areas, prompting the group to move the missile launch centers to distant mountains. The move explains the increased use of Houthi ballistic missiles specialized in land attacks and firing them at ships.

The Houthi group is focusing on causing the greatest loss and damage to international forces and their allies in the region through the use of ballistic missiles and drones against ships. It is also trying to inflict losses on the global economy, accompanied by media propaganda that exaggerates its capabilities, and winning Arab, Islamic, and international human rights and public opinion by linking its attacks to stopping the Israeli aggression on Palestinians.

By tracking the Houthi strikes, the intense attacks and their speed have slowed down; there are several reasons for this. The most important is the Houthi attempt to reduce the escalation as the effective date of their designation as a terrorist group approaches. The other reasons are the decline in the group's stock of missiles and drones due to the U.S.-UK  strikes on launch centers or due to the efforts of combating arms smuggling to Yemen and the exposure of weapon supply movements.

This war proves that Iran benefited from Israel's war on Palestinians in Gaza, and the Iranian regime demonstrated that its ally in Yemen can disrupt a critical maritime route, Bab al-Mandab, in the Red Sea, through which about 12% of total seaborne-traded oil passes.