Sheba Intelligence has obtained exclusive information indicating that the Houthi group, through its external intelligence sector and a specialized intelligence station operating in Muscat, has sought to obtain Chinese satellite imagery, coordinates and related geospatial capabilities to support its military and maritime operations.

According to the information, the discussions were conducted through a channel linked to the Iranian Embassy in Muscat and involved an intermediary security company. The name of the Chinese company Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. Ltd. was mentioned in connection with the reported arrangement.

The information suggests that the Houthis were not seeking satellite images as isolated products, but attempting to acquire a technical capability that would enable them to use satellite-derived data in operational planning. Such data could support maritime surveillance, tracking of naval and commercial vessels, protection of smuggling routes, and targeting activity in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.

Sheba Intelligence could not independently verify whether Chang Guang Satellite Technology directly supplied data or technology to the Houthis, whether the imagery was obtained through a third-party reseller, or whether the Chinese company was aware of the alleged end use. The identity and precise role of the intermediary security company remain under investigation.

Sources familiar with the matter said the reported discussions involved representatives linked to the Houthi external intelligence sector, an Iran-related diplomatic channel, and a private security intermediary. Sheba Intelligence is withholding some names pending further verification and right-of-reply efforts.

Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. Ltd., also known as CGSTL or Charming Globe, is a Chinese commercial satellite company based in Changchun, Jilin province. It operates the Jilin-1 satellite constellation, one of China’s prominent commercial remote-sensing systems. The company provides satellite imagery, remote-sensing data and geospatial information services for civilian and commercial uses, but such capabilities are considered dual-use because they can also support military and intelligence operations.

The Chinese company has previously come under U.S. scrutiny over alleged links to Houthi maritime attacks. Washington has accused Chang Guang Satellite Technology of supporting Houthi attacks on U.S. interests in the Red Sea, while the company and Chinese-linked media have denied the allegations.

The reported Muscat channel, if confirmed, would point to a new layer in the Houthi military system: the pursuit of external information infrastructure alongside missiles, drones and smuggling networks. Access to satellite imagery and geospatial coordinates could help the group expand its maritime awareness beyond Yemen’s coastline and improve its ability to monitor, select and assess targets.

There is no evidence that Omani authorities were involved in or aware of the alleged arrangement. Oman has long served as a diplomatic venue for Yemen-related contacts, but the reported use of a Muscat-based channel for intelligence-linked coordination highlights the risk that regional diplomatic spaces may be exploited by Iran-linked networks and armed non-state actors.

The information also underscores a growing challenge for Red Sea security: commercial satellite services, even when marketed for civilian purposes, can become part of the operational toolkit of armed groups when routed through brokers, resellers, security companies or intelligence-linked intermediaries.

Sheba Intelligence will continue investigating the reported Muscat-based channel, the role of the intermediary security company, the nature of the satellite imagery or technology allegedly sought by the Houthis, and whether these efforts can be linked to specific maritime attacks or smuggling operations in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.