Piracy is gradually returning to the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia and Yemen, raising concerns that an old maritime threat is reappearing at a time when international naval attention is heavily focused on Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.

Recent maritime alerts point to a growing pattern of suspicious approaches, armed skiffs, attempted boardings and hijackings across the wider Gulf of Aden–Somali Basin corridor. While the current level of activity remains far below the peak of Somali piracy more than a decade ago, the frequency and nature of the incidents suggest that pirate networks are testing security gaps and probing commercial vessels.

In May and June 2026, several vessels reported suspicious or hostile approaches near Socotra, the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor and Yemen’s southern coast. The incidents included small boats approaching merchant ships at close range, armed men on board, the use of ladders, gunfire and, in at least one reported case, a rocket-propelled grenade.

The pattern indicates a shift from isolated suspicious activity to more aggressive probing operations. In several cases, armed security teams on board commercial vessels fired warning shots or returned fire, forcing the approaching boats to withdraw. This suggests that pirate groups may be assessing vessel defenses before attempting more complex operations.

The renewed concern comes after EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta confirmed piracy incidents off the northern coast of Somalia in April 2026 involving the motor tanker HONOUR 25 and the merchant vessel SWARD. Atalanta also said it was investigating the hijacking of a dhow potentially linked to one of the incidents.

These developments suggest that pirate groups are not only operating close to the Somali coast, but may also be seeking to extend their reach into the Gulf of Aden, where dense shipping traffic, weak coastal control and regional instability create favorable conditions for criminal maritime activity.

The timing is critical. Since late 2023, the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab have been dominated by Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and naval responses by international coalitions. This has diverted attention, intelligence assets and naval resources toward the northern part of the maritime corridor, while broader areas of the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin remain vulnerable.

The return of piracy should not be confused with Houthi operations. Houthi attacks are politically and militarily driven, while piracy is primarily criminal and profit-oriented. However, both threats now operate in the same strategic maritime environment. The result is a more fragmented security picture stretching from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean.

This overlap has raised questions over whether the Houthis may seek to exploit the return of piracy as an additional pressure and revenue source. Publicly available information does not yet prove direct Houthi command-and-control over the new pirate groups. However, several indicators point to possible enabling, coordination or indirect benefit.

Reports in recent months have pointed to growing contacts between the Houthis and al-Shabaab in Somalia, including discussions related to weapons, training and maritime disruption. Security sources in Puntland have also alleged that Somali pirate groups received weapons and GPS devices through channels linked to the Houthis or their partners. These claims remain difficult to independently verify, but they add to concerns that piracy may be intersecting with wider smuggling and militant networks across the Gulf of Aden.

For the Houthis, a renewed piracy threat could create both strategic and financial advantages. Strategically, it would stretch international naval forces across a wider maritime theater and increase pressure on commercial shipping already affected by Red Sea attacks. Financially, any indirect role in ransom channels, protection payments, smuggling facilitation or weapons supply could provide new revenue opportunities for networks operating around the group.

The most likely scenario is not that the Houthis are directly managing every piracy incident, but that they may benefit from a permissive environment in which pirate networks, smugglers and militant actors increasingly overlap. This would allow the group to pressure maritime traffic without claiming responsibility, while maintaining plausible deniability.

For Yemen, the implications are serious. Incidents near Socotra, Aden and Balhaf place Yemen’s coastal geography at the center of a renewed security challenge. Any further increase in piracy could raise insurance costs, disrupt shipping confidence, complicate port recovery and expand the operating space for smuggling networks.

For Somalia, the incidents reflect the persistence of weak coastal enforcement, illegal fishing grievances, economic desperation and the ability of armed groups to exploit maritime disorder. The use of dhows or fishing vessels as possible mother ships remains one of the main concerns, as it allows pirates to operate farther from shore and target vessels beyond immediate coastal waters.

The current indicators do not yet amount to a full-scale return to the piracy wave of 2008–2012. But they do show that piracy has moved from a dormant risk to an active and gradually expanding threat.

If a major hijacking succeeds and leads to ransom payments, the Gulf of Aden could face a new cycle of pirate recruitment and operational expansion. In that scenario, the Red Sea crisis would no longer be defined only by Houthi attacks, but by overlapping threats from armed actors, pirate networks and criminal maritime groups along one of the world’s most sensitive shipping routes.