Houthi–Al-Shabaab Plan to Encircle Bab al-Mandab and Target Saudi Ships

Sheba Intelligence | 2026-09-03 07:28 AM UTC

 

Information obtained by Sheba Intelligence points to efforts to transfer missile and drone capabilities to Somalia and open a parallel maritime front along the African coast

 

    Sheba Intelligence has obtained information about a Houthi plan to expand maritime operations to the Somali coast in coordination with Al-Shabaab, placing shipping in Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden under pressure from both the Yemeni and African shores.

Sources said the Houthis had conducted communications through external intelligence stations responsible for managing the group’s relations and operations outside Yemen. The contacts focused on assigning surveillance, logistical and targeting roles while drawing on Al-Shabaab’s reach and local maritime networks along the Somali coast.

According to the information, the assignments include monitoring Saudi ships, tracking commercial fleet movements and providing intelligence that could be used to target commercial and military vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab.

The plan envisages a maritime front operating from the African coast alongside attacks launched from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen. This arrangement would expand the operational area, diversify launch and support locations and increase the burden on naval forces protecting international shipping lanes.

 

Transferring Missile and Drone Capabilities

Information obtained by Sheba Intelligence indicates that the Houthis intend to provide Al-Shabaab with armed drones, guided missiles and explosives, along with the technical expertise required to assemble and operate them.

The effort appears to extend beyond the delivery of ready-made weapons. It includes building a local capability in Somalia that would allow Al-Shabaab to operate drones and missiles against land and maritime targets without relying on a continuous supply of complete systems from Yemen.

Somalia’s long coastline could provide multiple locations for surveillance, launch and logistical support. Dispersed and mobile sites would make attacks more difficult to detect and intercept, while extending the potential threat from Bab al-Mandab into the Gulf of Aden and parts of the western Indian Ocean.

The information also points to the possibility that the Houthis could claim attacks launched from the African shore, incorporating them into their wider maritime campaign even when the execution or launch involved partners outside Yemen.

 

The Role of Pirate Networks

The communications also covered the use of pirates and maritime intermediaries in the Horn of Africa to provide information on vessel movements, boats, fuel, transport routes and access to coastal supply points.

The information does not suggest that all Somali pirate groups operate under Houthi or Al-Shabaab command. Specific intermediaries, however, could move between these circles and provide logistical or intelligence services for payment or through arrangements tailored to individual operations.

Such connections could allow the same maritime infrastructure to serve several activities, ranging from weapons smuggling and personnel transfers to vessel surveillance and access to boats and coastal locations.

 

Eight Names in the Liaison Network

As part of its investigation into the plan, Sheba Intelligence obtained the names of eight individuals involved in managing communications or facilitating joint activities: five Houthis and three Somalis.

A review found that two of the five Houthi names had previously appeared in other overseas operations linked to the group. This suggests that they may be connected to a broader structure managing Houthi activity outside Yemen rather than working exclusively on the Somalia file.

The three Somali names appeared in two overlapping tracks: contacts between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, and activities connecting the Houthis with pirate networks. Their presence in both places them in an intermediary position between armed groups and local maritime circles with access to boats, coastal routes and information about vessel movements.

 

A Network Tracked by Sheba Intelligence Since 2023

The latest information follows a series of Sheba Intelligence reports documenting the development of Houthi maritime links in the Horn of Africa.

 

September 2023: Naval Training Involving African Fishermen

On September 30, 2023, Sheba Intelligence reported that a specialised Houthi naval force was receiving training in Al-Luhiya on Yemen’s Red Sea coast.

The programme covered ship hijacking, naval mines, weapons smuggling and the placement of explosives along shipping routes. African fishermen also attended and were assigned to transfer weapons from larger ships to smaller boats before storing them on islands or nearby coastal areas.

The report provided an early indication that African maritime personnel were being incorporated into Houthi naval logistics.
 

Editorial note: Sheba Intelligence suspended publication between August 2024 and June 2026. The gap in coverage reflects the platform’s broadcasting hiatus and should not be read as evidence that the contacts or activities under review had ceased.

June 2026: Coordination with Al-Shabaab

After resuming publication, Sheba Intelligence reported on June 12 that coordination between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab was expanding in weapons smuggling, logistical support and the exchange of military expertise.

The report linked earlier activity in Al-Luhiya to routes between Yemen and Somalia, as maritime smuggling channels increasingly served to move weapons, personnel and expertise across the Gulf of Aden.
 

June 2026: A Camp for Somali and African Fighters

On June 26, Sheba Intelligence reported that the Houthis were working to establish a camp in the Golis Mountains near Odweyne. The site reportedly hosted Yemeni, Somali and other African fighters, along with specialists in missile and drone operations.

Sources said components for ballistic missiles and drones had been moved to the area in separate shipments. The project was intended to provide an alternative position on the African shore that could be used if Houthi military infrastructure in Hodeidah and along Yemen’s western coast came under sustained attack.
 

July 2026: The Camp Is Targeted

On July 19, Sheba Intelligence reported that an airstrike had targeted the camp near Odweyne five days earlier.

The camp reportedly provided infrastructure for training, equipment transfers and the concentration of fighters and specialists from Yemen and the Horn of Africa, extending the relationship beyond intermittent smuggling activity.
 

August 2026: Maritime Communications and Assigned Roles

On August 6, Sheba Intelligence cited intelligence sources as saying that senior Houthi operatives had communicated directly with Al-Shabaab through an external coordination station.

The discussions covered target selection, the allocation of responsibilities, surveillance of Saudi ships, tracking commercial traffic and supplying intelligence to operational units.

The information also pointed to efforts to establish a parallel front on the African coast that would work in conjunction with Houthi attacks launched from Yemen.
 

Expanding the Maritime Theatre

The latest information adds detail about the scope of the plan and the roles assigned within it, particularly the transfer of missiles and drones, the development of a local operating capability and the use of intermediaries and pirates for surveillance and logistics.

If these arrangements advance, launch and support activity would no longer be confined to Yemen’s coastline. It could spread across parts of the Somali coast, placing the southern Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden within a connected operational theatre.

Shipping and naval forces would then face several sources of risk that may not operate under a single field command but could share personnel, intelligence, boats, supply routes and targets.