Flight records reveal a durable civilian corridor between Dubai and Hargeisa. Viewed alongside Emirati-controlled port infrastructure, reported military construction in Berbera and new coastal logistics preparations, the route forms part of a broader network that has strengthened Somaliland’s ability to operate independently of Mogadishu.

On January 24, 2025, Flydubai Flight FZ661 aborted takeoff while preparing to depart Dubai for Hargeisa. The passengers and crew were evacuated safely and later transferred to another aircraft.

The incident was operationally limited. The route it drew attention to, however, is politically significant.

For more than a year, hundreds of flights have maintained a direct connection between Dubai and Hargeisa, linking Somaliland’s capital to one of the Gulf’s largest commercial and aviation hubs. At the same time, the UAE’s footprint in Somaliland has expanded through Berbera Port, a new maritime connection with Jebel Ali, reported military construction at Berbera Airport and, according to information obtained by Sheba Intelligence, preparations for supply, fuel and ammunition depots along the Somaliland coast.

An investigation by Sheba Intelligence, based on historical flight records, airline schedules, official commercial information and previous reporting, finds that the Dubai–Hargeisa route cannot be viewed merely as an isolated passenger service.

The flight data does not prove that the UAE uses civilian aircraft to transport weapons or directly support Somaliland’s separation from Somalia. It does show, however, that aviation has become the civilian arm of a wider Emirati network spanning ports, logistics, infrastructure and security.

Together, these links have reduced Somaliland’s dependence on institutions controlled by Mogadishu and strengthened its ability to maintain external relations as a separate political entity.

One Direct Route, Hundreds of Flights

The public aviation network between the UAE and Somaliland is concentrated in a single corridor: Dubai International Airport–Hargeisa’s Egal International Airport.

Flydubai operates the principal service under Flight FZ661, while Daallo Airlines advertises a weekly Dubai–Hargeisa sector before continuing to Mogadishu. Some booking platforms display additional marketing or code-share numbers, but these do not represent separate aircraft and must be removed to avoid double counting.

No regular direct passenger service was identified from Abu Dhabi or Sharjah to Hargeisa during the review period. Nor did the investigation find a scheduled direct passenger route from the UAE to Berbera.

Historical PlaneFinder records showed 307 Flydubai operations during 2025. Monthly activity reached 31 recorded departures in both July and August. The second half of the year produced 167 records, compared with 140 in the first half—an increase of approximately 19.3 percent.

Daallo’s weekly timetable would add about 52 scheduled departures if it operated throughout the year, but this remains a schedule-based estimate rather than a confirmed operational count. The investigation therefore does not present the combined figure as an official total.

What the Air Corridor Carries

The route primarily transports civilian passengers: members of the Somali diaspora, families, businesspeople, humanitarian and institutional personnel, officials, students and medical travellers.

Passenger aircraft may also carry limited commercial freight in their holds. But the investigation did not obtain passenger manifests or cargo records capable of identifying every traveller or shipment.

There is no evidence in the reviewed data that the scheduled passenger flights carried weapons, military equipment or personnel deployed for covert operations.

What the corridor unquestionably carries is connectivity.

A direct flight allows travellers, companies and delegations to reach Hargeisa without passing through an airport administered by Somalia’s federal authorities. It enables Somaliland to operate immigration, customs and aviation procedures through institutions under its own control.

The political effect is cumulative: routine flights reinforce Hargeisa’s practical capacity to engage internationally, even when the service itself remains commercial.

The Visible Civilian Layer of a Wider Network

Viewed alone, Dubai–Hargeisa appears to be a modest regional passenger route. Viewed alongside the UAE’s other activities, it becomes one component of a much larger system.

Dubai-owned DP World operates Berbera Port and the associated economic zone. The company also promotes a maritime service connecting Berbera with Jebel Ali, with calls at Aden and Djibouti, linking Somaliland’s port infrastructure directly to the UAE and onward markets in the Horn of Africa. (DP World)

The port and air route serve different functions. Hargeisa is the principal publicly visible passenger gateway, while Berbera is increasingly positioned as a maritime, commercial and strategic logistics centre.

That distinction is important. The absence of scheduled passenger flights to Berbera does not mean the airport is inactive or insignificant. Private, cargo, government and military flights may not appear consistently in public tracking platforms.

Military Construction at Berbera

In July 2026, Le Monde reported that major construction had accelerated at Berbera Airport, based partly on satellite imagery showing excavation work south of the runway.

The newspaper reported that the UAE was leading the project and that underground facilities were believed by security sources to be intended for fuel or ammunition storage. It described the facility as potentially serving the UAE, the United States and Israel in a strategic location facing the Gulf of Aden and the Yemeni coast. 

The reported construction coincided with a major change in Somaliland’s international position. Israel formally recognised Somaliland on December 26, 2025, becoming the first state to do so—a decision rejected by Somalia and criticised by the African Union and other governments.

The existence of military infrastructure in Berbera does not establish that passengers aboard Dubai–Hargeisa flights are connected to the project. But it places the civilian air corridor within a rapidly changing strategic environment.

Hargeisa provides the regular civilian connection; Berbera provides the port, long runway and expanding logistics infrastructure.

New Coastal Preparations

The latest information obtained by Sheba Intelligence adds another layer.

Sources told the platform that the UAE was preparing storage sites for supplies, fuel and ammunition along areas of the Somaliland coast. The sources assessed that the preparations could support a future military or maritime operation, although the precise purpose and operational timeline could not be independently established.

Sheba Intelligence has also previously reported the presence of training activity involving UAE-linked Yemeni forces in Somaliland and preparations associated with possible maritime operations connected to Socotra. These reports indicate that Somaliland is increasingly being used not only as a commercial platform but also as a space in which competing Yemeni and regional actors can organise, train or build logistical depth.

These findings remain distinct from the civilian flight records. The investigation found no evidence allowing the passenger route itself to be classified as military.

But the coexistence of regular air access, port control, coastal storage preparations and military construction shows that the UAE’s Somaliland engagement operates across several mutually reinforcing layers.

Mogadishu’s Accusation

Somalia’s federal government views direct foreign engagement with Somaliland as a challenge to its sovereignty.

In January 2026, Mogadishu annulled its agreements with the UAE, including port, defence and security arrangements, accusing Abu Dhabi of undermining Somalia’s national unity and federal authority. Somaliland, Puntland and Jubbaland rejected the federal decision and said their cooperation with the UAE would continue. 

DP World subsequently stated that its operations at Berbera Port were continuing under existing agreements despite Mogadishu’s decision. 

The dispute goes beyond commercial contracts.

From Mogadishu’s perspective, direct agreements with Somaliland, investments in institutions controlled by Hargeisa, and strategic infrastructure developed without federal approval all contribute to Somaliland’s ability to function separately.

The UAE has not publicly based its Somaliland engagement on a formal policy of supporting secession. Commercial investment and security cooperation do not, by themselves, prove an intention to dismantle Somalia’s territorial unity.

Yet their practical effect is difficult to ignore.

The Route Falters, Then Returns

The Dubai–Hargeisa corridor did not expand continuously.

PlaneFinder recorded 25 Flydubai operations in January 2026 and 19 in February. No operations appeared in its historical record for March, followed by ten in April, two in May, eight in June and five between July 1 and 9.

The sharp interruption coincided with broader regional airspace disruptions affecting Gulf aviation. Other tracking platforms displayed different monthly totals, suggesting that some databases may include scheduled or cancelled services while others record only successfully tracked flights.

The flight data therefore supports a careful conclusion: the corridor expanded during 2025, suffered a severe disruption in spring 2026 and subsequently began a gradual recovery. It does not support a claim of uninterrupted annual growth.

Does the Investigation Prove UAE Support for Somaliland’s Separation?

Not in the narrow legal or diplomatic sense.

The investigation found no document in which the UAE formally committed itself to Somaliland’s independence. Nor did the flight records prove that civilian services carried weapons or were organised to support separatist activities.

But the investigation establishes a more consequential finding.

The UAE has built and sustained a network that allows Somaliland to deepen international relationships outside Somalia’s federal system. That network includes:

direct passenger access through Hargeisa;

port and economic infrastructure in Berbera;

a maritime connection with Jebel Ali;

reported military construction at Berbera Airport;

and recent logistical preparations along the coast.

Each element can be presented individually as commercial, transport or security cooperation. Combined, they strengthen Hargeisa’s practical autonomy and reduce its dependence on Mogadishu.

This does not conclusively prove the strongest version of Somalia’s accusation—that the UAE is deliberately engineering Somaliland’s separation.

It does demonstrate why Mogadishu sees the Emirati role as a sovereignty issue rather than an ordinary foreign investment relationship.

The Investigation’s Final Finding

The Dubai–Hargeisa route is not a secret military airlift. It is a regular civilian passenger corridor.

Its significance lies in how it fits into the broader structure surrounding it.

The investigation finds that the air route has become the visible civilian component of an expanding Emirati network in Somaliland. Ports, maritime services, airport infrastructure, coastal logistics and direct air connectivity now form an interconnected system linking Hargeisa and Berbera more closely to the UAE than to institutions administered from Mogadishu.

The evidence does not prove that Abu Dhabi formally supports Somaliland’s independence. But it shows that Emirati engagement has produced an outcome that advances Somaliland’s separation in practice: greater external access, stronger autonomous institutions and a reduced need to rely on Somalia’s federal government.

The UAE’s policy therefore remains formally ambiguous but operationally significant.

For Somaliland, the network provides infrastructure for international autonomy.

For Mogadishu, that infrastructure is part of the separation it is trying to prevent.